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Abstract 
 
The article analyses the effects of the implementation of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement, which had been based on a “political” compromise with various 
static and dynamic elements, with regard to the functioning of institutions, 
developments in the party system, rule of law, effective administration and the 
economy. In particular the role of the High Representative and the Constitutional 
Court´s jurisprudence are highlighted for post-conflict reconstruction through 
state- and nation-building. Finally, based also on a critique of the role of the 
International Community, the remaining problems are addressed such as the 
economic viability and attractiveness for foreign investment and the need to 
shift the balance more from ethnic power-sharing to state effectiveness. In this 
regard, lessons to be learned from the Bosnian case study are drawn and put into 
a prospective context for further integration into the European Union.  
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Post-conflict Reconstruction through State- and 
Nation-building:  
The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Joseph Marko 
 
 
1. How to End a War? The Dayton Peace Agreement as a Political 
Compromise 
The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), having been one of the six 
republics of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, was a 
Yugoslavia “en miniature” with three peoples, the Muslims, Serbs, and Croats 
– none of them in an absolute majority position - and 15 national minorities 
living intermingled on the entire territory until 1991. BiH was seen therefore 
by many both in the West and the East as a model of a multiethnic society 
with peaceful interethnic co-existence. However, with the proclamation of an 
independent Republika Srpska (RS) on the territory of BiH in the process of the 
dissolution of communist Yugoslavia in the beginning of 1992 and the war from 
1992 to 1995, massive ethnic cleansing and the creation of contiguous, 
ethnically homogenous territories went hand in hand. In April 1994 also the 
Federation of BiH was created on the territory held by the army of the 
Republic of BiH to stop the war between Muslims and Croats which had broken 
out in 1993 to adjust the military situation on the ground with newly drawn 
borderlines on maps after the “cantonization” of BiH had been proposed by 
international mediators. Unlike Republika Srpska, which was established and 
still is a central state, the Federation became territorially subdivided into ten 
cantons: five with a majority Muslim population, three with a majority Croat 
population and two so-called “mixed“ cantons. The Muslims were renamed 
Bosniacs and a Bosnian language was created in addition to Serbian and 
Croatian; thereby finishing the political separation of the former Serbo-
Croatian or Croat-Serbian language. Both political entities – at war with each 
other – had a fully fledged institutional structure like sovereign states with 
constitutions and all legislative, executive and judicial organs including 
supreme and constitutional courts.
1  
 
 
1   On the constitutional and political developments from 1991 to 1995 see Joseph Marko, “The Ethno-
National Effects of Territorial Delimitation in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, in Swiss Institute of 
Comparative Law/Venice Commission (eds.), Local Self-Government, Territorial Integrity and 
Protection of Minorities (Schulthess, Zürich, 1996), 121–143.  
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So, with the Dayton-Paris Agreement of December 1995 a political 
“compromise” was achieved to end the war. This compromise was legally 
institutionalised in the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP)
2 and 
its annexes, in particular in Annex 4, the Constitution of BiH and Annex 10, 
creating the Office of the High Representative (OHR), which is responsible for 
coordinating the efforts of international and national actors in the civilian 
implementation of the GFAP. What are the elements of this compromise? 
This compromise brought a “federalisation” of the former centralist 
Socialist Republic of BiH. As a price for the legal fiction of the legal 
continuation of the state, which had been internationally recognised in 1992 
as the “Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, the RS and the Federation of BiH 
were only constitutionally recognised as so-called “Entities” of BiH, the new 
name for the common state. Thereby the border that had been violently 
created between them was also codified. On the other hand, as a dynamic 
element, the Constitution and Annex 7 clearly entrenched the return of 
refugees and (internally) displaced persons as one of the main goals of the 
Peace Agreement in order to protect or even re-establish the multiethnic 
society which had existed before 1992.  
Following the model of the Washington Agreement of April 1994 which 
created the bi-national Federation of Bosniacs and Croats, the Dayton-
Constitution also brought a complex system of ethnic power-sharing for almost 
all the institutions of BiH. So BiH has a bi-cameral legislature where the three 
so-called “constituent peoples”, Bosniacs, Serbs and Croats, are represented 
in parity (5:5:5) in the second chamber, the House of Peoples. The same holds 
true for the collective State Presidency consisting of one Bosniac, one Serb, 
and one Croat member. Also the government with a chair and ministers and 
their deputies is composed according to an ethnic key. The Constituional 
Court, which is the only court established at the state level, is the only state 
institution for which the Constitution did not proscribe an ethnic key. In 
actual practice, however, two Serbs, two Croats and two Bosniacs were 
elected by the Entity Parliaments in 1997 as “domestic” judges in addition to 
the three international judges appointed by the President of the European 
Court of Human Rights. In addition to this ethnic representation, mutual veto 
power was entrenched in the Constitution. Each member of the Presidency 
and the members of the caucuses of the constituent peoples in parliament 
could declare a decision or bill “destructive of the vital interest” of a 
constituent people. In contrast to these ethnic and collective rights, both the 
Constitution and Annex 6 of the GFAP on the protection of human rights do, of 
 
 
2   OHR, The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 14 December 1995, 
at http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=380. 
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course, also contain a catalogue of individual human rights based on the idea 
of the ethnically indifferent citizen, as can be seen from the non-
discrimination provisions. However, institutional ethnic power-sharing seems 
to be predominant.  
Following the pattern of the preservation of the fully fledged institutional 
structures of the “Entities”, they retained many of the responsibilities which 
they had before Dayton. Therefore, according to Article III of the BiH 
Constitution, the institutions at state level possess only few responsibilities 
such as foreign policy, customs policy, monetary policy, finances of the 
common institutions, immigration, refugee, and asylum policy, international 
and inter-Entity criminal law enforcement, common and international 
communication facilities, inter-Entity transportation, and air-traffic control. 
Hence, in the division of competencies, defence and therefore the two 
armies, the police, the judiciary, education and culture remained in the 
domain of the Entities. Moreover, Art VIII of the Constitution makes the 
institutions of BiH totally dependent of the Entities for financial support. They 
have, in a ratio of 2:1, to raise the revenues required by the budget of the 
state. In comparison, the state of BiH is one of the weakest federations, if it 
is considered a federation at all, since many Serb constitutional lawyers call it 
more a confederation, others a “complex state” or “union”.  
2. Problems of the Implementation of the Dayton Agreement 
What were the effects
3 of these theoretical, constitutional and institutional 
compromises in the phase of re-construction of state and society after 1995? 
On the state level, power-sharing in the ethnically representative 
institutions did not work. Instead of a positive elite consensus for co-operation 
making state reconstruction work, a negative consensus after the principle of 
divide et impera prevailed so that the Presidency and the Parliament were 
blocked along ethnic lines and were unable to adopt the necessary decisions 
and laws for the reconstruction of the state and the war-torn economy. The 
Constitutional Court was the only permanently functioning institution at state 
level, because there was no veto power foreseen and despite or due to the 
fact that it remained financially dependent on foreign donations and could not 
rely on the state budget.  
 
 
3    The most comprehensive analyses are David Chandler, Bosnia. Faking Democracy after Dayton 
(Pluto Press, London, 1999); Sumantra Bose, Bosnia after Dayton, Nationalist Partition and 
International Intervention (Hurst and Co., London, 2002); Christophe Solioz and Tobias K. Vogel 
(eds.),  Dayton and Beyond: Perspectives on the Future of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Nomos, 
Baden-Baden, 2004).  
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On the Entity level, ethnic cleansing and homogenisation was continued at 
first, as can be seen from the fact that until 2000 there was no substantive 
“minority” returns of refugees and displaced persons, i.e. that Serbs would 
return to the Federation and Bosniacs and Croats into RS.
4 Moreover, schools 
remained segregated on the basis of the right to “mother-tongue” instruction, 
despite of the fact that differences between Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian (B-C-S) 
are minor. This homogenisation is also shown by figures on the ethnic 
composition of the executive and judiciary in the Entities, published by the 
Constitutional Court in the landmark decision on “constituent peoples” (3rd 
Partial Decision in U 5/98 as of July 2000)
5, which show that there were 
virtually no non-Serbs represented in the government, judiciary and police of 
RS and almost no Serbs in the respective institutions of the Federation. 
Secondly, through legislation in all of their fields of powers, the Entities 
enforced the already existing legal fragmentation, creating more and more 
barriers to the free movement of people, goods, services and capital in 
opposition to the guarantee of a common market as is foreseen in the 
Constitution of BiH. Moreover, the Entities were not ready to make use of the 
constitutional provision of a transfer of powers to the state level by 
negotiations.  
Despite repeated elections on all levels and election-engineering by the 
OSCE, which was responsible for the organisation of elections according to 
Annex 3 of the GFAP, the three nationalist parties SDA, SDS and HDZ
6, 
representing most of the Bosniac, Serb and Croat electorate and having 
dominated the political system before the war started, were – with the 
exception of the year 2000 - repeatedly re-elected and thereby 
democratically legitimised. So, all efforts of the OSCE and the International 
Community (IC) to establish a multi-ethnic party system failed.
7  
Moreover, there is not only a lack of elite co-operation due to nationalist 
exclusiveness. According to opinion polls in 2002 only 53% of the Bosniac 
electorate are for a common and strong state. Fully 53% of Serbs want 
independence and/or the annexation of RS to Serbia in contrast to just 13% 
who are for a common state for BiH. Again only 19% of Croats stand up for BiH 
as it is, whereas 31% opt for a third, separate Croat entity and 18% for an 
 
 
4    UNHCR, “Returns Summary To Bosnia and Herzegovina from 01/01/96 to 31/01/05”, at 
http://www.unhcr.ba. 
5   Constitutional Court, Case No. U-5/98-III, 1 July 2000, at http://www.ccbh.ba, (Službeni glasnik BiH 
[Official Journal], No. 23/00, 14 September 2000). 
6    These are the Serb-Croat-Bosnian acronyms for the Party for Democratic Action, the Serb 
Democratic Party, and the Croatian Democratic Community.  
7   See International Crisis Group (ICG), “Bosnia’s Nationalist Governments: Paddy Ashdown and the 
Paradoxes of State Building”, 146 ICG Balkan Report (Sarajevo, Brussels, 22 July 2003). 
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independent Herceg-Bosna.
8 These figures clearly show that the majorities of 
two of the three constituent peoples do not really want the common state 
BiH. Moreover, there is a desperate lack of a civic concept of BiH statehood 
and an “overarching” Bosnian identity. 
Due to the failures of elite co-operation and the ethnic “pillarisation” of 
the society, the re-construction of the war-torn economy failed and, 
consequently, the transition from a socialist to a market economy was also 
very slow. This was camouflaged in the years after Dayton by massive foreign 
aid. It became visible only after 2000 that the economy of BiH is totally aid-
dependent instead of investment driven, due to the lack of foreign investment 
again caused by the lack of an effective rule of law.  
On the other hand, due to the territorial delimitation of powers to the 
Entities and cantons, there is a huge state apparatus with 13 Prime Ministers, 
dozens of ministers, around 750 elected representatives and 1200 judges and 
prosecutors
9 for a population of 4 million which is, however, not able to 
secure effective legal security and basic public services (pensions, social 
security). 
In conclusion, the institutionalisation of ethnic power-sharing on state level 
on the basis of territorial strongholds of nationalist forces in the Entities 
prevailed over the civic principle so that almost every aspect of state and 
society became seen through the ethnic lens. This, however, did not 
contribute to the establishment of mutual trust and interethnic co-operation 
nor did it foster reconciliation and the formation of a common state identity, 
but instead it prevented effective state reconstruction and nation-building. At 
the same time, the recognition of the Entities and their strong powers, which 
they did not want to give up, enforced the disintegrative factors and 
tendencies of the ethno-national divide.  
3. The Roles of the High Representative and the Constitutional 
Court 
However, there are two institutions which acted against the disintegration of 
state and society. 
 
 
8   UNDP, “Early Warning System Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Quarterly Report, July-September 2003, 
Sarajevo 2003 and UNDP, “Early Warning System Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Annual Report 2002, 
Sarajevo 2003.  
9   International Crisis Group (ICG), “Courting Disaster: The Misrule of Law in Bosnia & Herzegovina”, 
127 ICG Balkan Report (Sarajevo, Brussels, 25 March 2002), and International Crisis Group (ICG), 
“Rule of Law in Public Administration: Confusion and Discrimination in a Post-Communist 
Bureaucracy”, 84 ICG Balkan Report (Sarajevo, Brussels, 15 December 1999). 
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First of all, it is the responsibility of the High Representative (HR) to work 
for the civilian implementation of the GFAP and thereby for the 
reconstruction of the state. In the very beginning after 1995, however, the HR 
was a “toothless” tiger against the obstruction of the ethno-nationalist parties 
and politicians in the institutions of BiH due to the competencies given to him 
under Annex 10 of the GFAP. Thus, in 1997, the mandate of the HR was 
extended by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) Meeting in Bonn so that 
he could intervene in the legislative process and dismiss obstructionist public 
officials.
10 Based on these new, so-called “Bonn Powers”, the HR immediately 
started an integrationist legislation for state and society by decreeing laws on 
citizenship, the flag, the national anthem, the currency, ethnically neutral 
licence plates and passports: all laws the nationalist parties could not agree 
on in the Parliamentary Assembly. Secondly, HR Petritsch started to dismiss 
more and more public officials, from mayors up to members of the collective 
State Presidency for obstruction against the implementation of the GFAP.
11 
The second institution which effectively counterbalanced the nationalist 
and disintegrative tendencies was the Constitutional Court of BiH.
12 Already in 
1999 the Constitutional Court declared the Law on Government of BIH 
unconstitutional because it had foreseen a system of ethnically divided Co-
chairs of the government who would effectively appoint the ministers 
(U1/99)
13. The landmark decision, however, became the case U 5/98 which 
was decided and published in 2000 in four partial decisions.
14 In particular the 
third Partial Decision is known as the so-called “constituent peoples” 
decision. Then-President Alija Izetbegovic had brought the case before the 
Constitutional Court since the Entities’ constitutions, despite an express 
provision in the Dayton constitution with a time limit of six months, had not 
been brought into conformity with the Dayton constitution by 1998. So the 
claim alleged that more than 20 provisions in the Entity constitutions, most 
importantly the official languages, the status of the Orthodox Church, the 
command authority of the Entities presidents over armed forces, the 
 
 
10   For a critical analysis of these powers and the relation between the HR and the Constitutional Court 
of BiH see Joseph Marko, “Challenging the Authority of the UN High Representative before the 
Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, in Erika de Wet and André Nollkaemper (eds.), 
Review of the Security Council by Member States (Intersentia, Antwerp, Oxford, New York, 2003), 
113-117.  
11   Christian J. Ebner, “The Bonn Powers – Still necessary?”, in Predrag Jurekovic (ed.), From Peace 
Making to Self Sustaining Peace- International Presence in South East Europe at a Crossroads? 
(Landesverteidigungsakademie, Vienna, 2004), 118-150.  
12   See Joseph Marko, “Five Years of Constitutional Jurisprudence in Bosnia and Herzegovina: a First 
Balance“, in 7 European Autonomy and Diversity Papers - EDAP (2004), at 
http://www.eurac.edu/edap. 
13   Constitutional Court, Case U-1/99, 14 August 1999, at http://www.ccbh.ba. 
14   Constitutional Court, Case U-5/98, 30 January 2000, Službeni glasnik BiH, No. 11/00, 17 April 2000; 
19 February 2000, Službeni glasnik BiH, No. 17/00, 30 June 2000; 1 July 2000, Službeni glasnik BiH, 
No. 23/00, 14 September 2000; 19 August 2000, Službeni glasnik BiH, No. 36/00, 31 December 2000. 
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institution of socially-owned property as a communist legacy and the position 
of constituent peoples were contrary to the Dayton constitution. In particular 
the claim that constituent peoples have to be constituent “on the entire 
territory of BiH” aimed at the break up of the nationalist exclusiveness, 
discrimination and segregation at Entity level.  
The alternatives for the Constitutional Court were either to uphold the 
“historic” compromise at Dayton in 1995, with the recognition of a national 
state of the Serb people, as the name Republika Srpska clearly enough 
indicated, and the bi-national Federation as the price for a negative peace 
with the consequence of legitimising ethnic cleansing and national 
homogenisation through territorial separation, or to rely on the other 
constitutionally entrenched, dynamic goal of the GFAP, namely the return of 
refugees and displaced persons in order to re-establish a multiethnic society. 
With a narrow 5:4 vote, and the Serb and Croat judges dissenting, the 
Constitutional Court decided that all of the three constituent peoples have to 
be also constituent peoples on Entity level in order to break up the national 
homogenisation of the Entities without, however, giving clear directions for 
the necessary constitutional amendments and thereby institutional changes 
except for a warning to introduce “vital interest clauses”, i.e. veto powers of 
constituent peoples, on all levels of government.
15  
The second most important integrative step in this decision was the ruling 
to allow for “framework legislation” of the state in those fields which were 
deemed the exclusive competence of the Entities. In an important 
interpretation of Article III in the context of the entire constitutional text, the 
majority of the Court argued that the Constitution does not foresee a system 
of mutually exclusive competences of the institutions of BiH and the Entities, 
but that there are concurring competences in fields which – through an 
isolated reading of Article III – seem to be an exclusive responsibility of either 
the institutions of BiH or the Entities.  
In conclusion, the Constitutional Court did provide the ground for a 
strengthening of the state responsibilities in order to counterbalance the 
disintegrative forces following from the division of powers and did shift the 
balance from collective rights and ethnic power-sharing of constituent peoples 
to the protection of minorities and the rights of individual citizens with a 
strong emphasis on the non-discrimination principle again to break the ground 
for the re-establishment of a multiethnic society.  
 
 
15   See Carsten Stahn, „Die verfassungsrechtliche Pflicht zur Gleichstellung der drei ethnischen 
Volksgruppen in den bosnischen Teilrepubliken - Neue Hoffnung für das Friedensmodell von 
Dayton?“, 60 (3-4) ZaöRV (2000), 663-701. 
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However, the implementation of this decision of the Constitutional Court 
through constitutional amendments on the Entity level did again require 
pressure from the High Representative. He installed constitutional 
commissions
16 and brokered the “Mrkovica-Sarajevo-Agreement”
17 of the 
parties for the draft constitutional amendments. When the Serb parties did 
not fully stick to the text of the Agreement, he again imposed the 
constitutional amendments.
18  
Contrary to the decision of the Constitutional Court, however, which had 
sought to de-ethnicise the institutional structures with its warning on veto 
powers, the amendments of the Entities’ constitutions reinforced the ethnic 
principle by providing for the ethnic representation of the constituent peoples 
and so-called “Others” on all institutional levels in the legislature, the 
executive and the judiciary. Moreover, vital interest clauses and thereby the 
possibility to block the entire decision-making process which had led to 
obstruction on the state level were also introduced in the legislative process 
of the Entities.
19 
The first case in order to decide whether a vital interest had correctly been 
invoked in the parliamentary legislative process was brought before the 
Constitutional Court of BiH in 2004 in case U 8/04.
20 The Court took a decision 
on the merits in order to de-block the work of the Parliamentary Assembly. In 
an interesting twist to define the term “vital interest”, the Constitutional 
Court declared first that effective participation of constituent peoples 
without domination of one group was the “vital interest” and went on to 
argue that efficient participation of constituent peoples must be balanced 
with the efficient operation of the state: “Vital interests must not endanger 
the implementation of the theory of state functionality which is closely 
connected to the neutral and essential understanding of the term citizenship 
as the criterion of national affiliation. In other words, the protection of vital 
 
 
16   OHR, Decision Establishing Interim Procedures to Protect Vital Interests of Constituent Peoples and 
Others, including Freedom from Discrimination, 11 January 2001, at 
http://www.ohr.int/print/?content_id=365, (Službeni glasnik BiH, No. 2/01) and OHR Press Office, 
“High Representative names Members of the Constitutional Commissions of the Entity Parliaments”, 
7 February 2001, at http://www.ohr.int/print/?content_id=4216. 
17   OHR, Agreement on the Implementation of the Constituent Peoples’ Decision of the Constitutional 
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 22 March 2002, at http://www.ohr.int/print/?content_id=7273. 
18    OHR, Decision on Constitutional Amendments in Republika Srpska, 19 April 2002, at 
http://www.ohr.int/print/?content_id=7474, (Službeni glasnik RS, No. 21/02, 25 April 2002) and 
OHR, Decision on Constitutional Amendments in the Federation, 19 April 2002, at 
http://www.ohr.int/print/?content_id=7475, (Službene novine FBiH [Official Journal], No. 16/02, 
28 April 2002). 
19   See International Crisis Group (ICG), “Implementing Equality: The ‘Constituent Peoples’ Decision in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina”, 128 ICG Balkans Report (Sarajevo, Brussels, 16 April 2002). 
20   Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Case No. U-8/04, 25 June 2004, at 
http://www.ccbh.ba. 
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interests must not lead to unnecessary disintegration of civil society as the 
necessary category of the modern sovereignty.” In conclusion, the contested 
proposal of a Framework Law on Higher Education in BiH was declared 
destructive of the vital interest, but contrary to the intention of the 
requesters, not because it did not guarantee them a university with 
instruction in the Croatian language only, but due to the fact that it did not 
provide for equality of all the three languages and thereby access to higher 
education for members of all the constituent peoples and others in order to 
counterbalance segregation in this field.  
In a similar case, U 2/04
21 from the same date, the draft law on 
Amendments to the Law on Refugees and Displaced Persons of BiH was 
declared destructive of vital interests of the Bosniac people. Again the Court 
argued that the vital interest is to neutralize the consequences of mass 
exodus of constituent peoples and the return of refugees is necessary “to re-
establish the multi-ethnic society which existed before the war without any 
territorial divisions on ethnic grounds”.  
Already in case U 44/01
22, adopted in February 2004, the Constitutional 
Court had declared the renaming of Bosnian cities and municipalities by RS 
authorities during the war by use of the suffix Serb to be unconstitutional 
because this process was inherently discriminatory. Since Serb majorities had 
been the consequence of war and ethnic cleansing and the designation of 
these municipalities as “Serbian” would prevent the return of refugees, this 
process violated an explicit obligation under Article II/5 of the Constitution 
and Annex 7 of the GFAP. In an unprecedented motion, the Constitutional 
Court then renamed all of these cities and municipalities as a preliminary 
measure under its Rules of Procedure in September 2004 “in order to prevent 
legal chaos as long as the Parliament of Republika Srpska does not implement 
the Constitutional Court decision”. 
In conclusion, the Constitutional Court went on to counterbalance the 
effects of ethnic cleansing and the domination of the ethnic principle by 
referring to the necessity of state functionality and the citizenship principle.  
Also the High Representative did put further pressure on the parties after 
2001 in order to strengthen the state level for integrative purposes. Hence the 
number of ministries on the state level was increased and a State Court
23 was 
 
 
21   Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Case No. U-2/04, 25 June 2004, see 
http://www.ccbh.ba
22   Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Case No. U 44/01, 22 September 2004, Službeni 
glasnik BiH, No.18/04. 
23   OHR, Decision establishing the BiH State Court, 12 November 2000, 
http://www.ohr.int/decisions/statemattersdec/default.asp?content_id=362.  
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established in addition to the Constitutional Court of BiH. With the Law on 
Defence a BiH Ministry of Defence and a common command for both armies 
were created.
24 Also a State Border Service
25 took over control of the external 
borders from the Entities and a VAT
26 collected by the state was introduced. 
After having integrated also the armies by 2005, with the approval of the 
police reform
27 the last important obstacle to start negotiations on a 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU was removed. The new 
local police regions will be based on technical, and not ethnic criteria. 
4. BiH at the Cross-roads: from Semi-protectorate to European 
Integration: 
Despite the integrative role the HR and the Constitutional Court play to make 
BiH a functioning multiethnic federation, serious problems remain:  
Due to the territorial subdivision into Entities and cantons in the Federation 
and finally municipalities for the local level in both Entities, a complex, 
overburdened institutional structure of the state bureaucracy remains in place 
which cannot be financed and does not provide the necessary public services 
in a professional and neutral way. Hence, the European Stability Initiative 
(ESI), a Berlin based think-tank, made an interesting proposal to “make 
federalism work” in January 2004.
28  According to this proposal, the Entity 
level should be abolished and RS and the ten cantons, without re-drawing 
boundaries, should become the new territorial subunits of BiH. Thereby the 
powers of the Entities should be either further devolved to the local level 
closer to the citizens or transferred upwards to the state level to strengthen 
the state. This proposal was met with “mixed feelings” in BiH itself. On the 
 
 
24    OHR, Decision Amending the Constitution of Republika Srpska, 02 April 2003, 
http://www.ohr.int/decisions/statemattersdec/default.asp?content_id=29617, (Službeni glasnik RS, 
No. 31/03, 3 May 2003), Decision Amending the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 02 April 2003, 
http://www.ohr.int/decisions/statemattersdec/default.asp?content_id=29622, (Službene novine 
FBiH, No. 18/03, 9 May 2003) and Zakon o odbrani Bosne i Hercegovine (BiH Defence Law), 
http://www.mod.gov.ba/bos/bos_zakonoodbr.html, (Službeni glasnik BiH, No. 43/03, 29 December 
2003).  
25   Zakon o Državnoj granicnoj službi Bosne i Hercegovine (Law on the State Border Service of BiH), 
Službeni glasnik BiH, No.19/01 and 50/04. 
26   Zakon o porezu na dodatu vrijednost (Law on the Value Added Tax), Službeni glasnik, No. 09/05 and 
Zakon o izmjenama i dopunama zakona o porezu na dodatu vrijednost (Amendments to the Law on 
the Value Added Tax), Službeni glasnik BiH, No. 35/05, 6 June 2005. 
27   Narodna skupstina Republike Srpske, “Odluka o prihvatanju Sporazuma o restruktuiranju policijskih 
struktura u Bosni i Hercegovini” (Parliament of BiH, “Decision on the Adoption of the Agreement on 
the Reform of Police Structures in BiH”), Službeni glasnik RS, No. 89/05 and “Sporazum o 
restruktuiranju policijskih struktura u Bosni i Hercegovini” (“Agreement on the Reform of Police 
Structures in BiH”), at http://www.narodnaskupstinars.net/lat/odluke/odluka.php?id_odluke=42.  
28   European Stability Initiative (ESI), “Making Federalism Work - A Radical Proposal for Practical 
Reform”, ESI Reports, Berlin, 8 January 2004, 
http://www.esiweb.org/docs/showdocument.php?document_ID=48.  
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one hand, the existing Serbian political power elite, despite the development 
of a formal multi-party system, will never give up RS and immediately raised 
serious objections to the “downgrading” of RS into one canton out of eleven. 
This despite the fact that RS would not further be subdivided and no new 
borders drawn, which seems a dangerous undertaking on the Balkans anyway. 
Moreover, the overburdening bureaucracy would only slightly be reduced if 
the Entity governmental structures of the Federation are abolished. The real 
problem, in my opinion, is not the size of the sub-national territorial units and 
their institutional structures, but the economic viability of the country as a 
whole as well as of its regions. The big challenge will be to make any 
territorial subunits attractive for foreign investment in tourism and industry.
29  
This problem goes hand in hand with the alternative of a functioning state 
and the “ethnic compromise”. As can be seen from the process of 
implementation of the GFAP, there is no abstract, theoretical formula to be 
applied. One of the lessons to be learned from the example of BiH is, that the 
overemphasis on democratisation is wrong. If elections come too early without 
the necessary preconditions, i.e. free media throughout the country and a re-
established civil society instead of ethnic pillarisation of the population, the 
nationalist elites are reinforced and democratically legitimised. Moreover, 
rule of law was not a topic immediately after Dayton. The necessity of a 
functioning system of rule of law was recognised by the IC only in 2000. With 
the Civil Service Law and the creation of High Judicial and Prosecutorial 
Councils
30 and the entire re-appointment process in the judiciary in 2002/03 
serious efforts were made to fight political party patronage and crony 
appointments in the public sector based on national affiliations, even if these 
processes did not meet the self-proclaimed standards of rule of law as 
indicated below. However, the constitutional amendments of the Entities’ 
constitutions in 2002 brought, at the same time, a strict ethnic representation 
for all groups in all executive and judicial institutions, in particular in the 
 
 
29   At the very moment (November 2005), however, there is little prospect for reform. Although all 
parties speak of the necessity to create „Dayton II” by adopting a new constitution, the question of 
territorial division seems to block any other argument. All the Serb parties of RS, including Milorad 
Dodik´s Social Democrats, refuse to give up RS as an Entity of BiH. The Croat HDZ is willing to 
create viable regions as proposed by the Bosniac SDS, but only if RS is abolished. If this is not the 
case, they insist on the creation of their own “Croat” Entity. This would further entrench the logic 
of ethno-nationalist domination of territory, accepted in Dayton, but fought against by the 
Constitutional Court and the HR so far. For the respective Serb and Croat political party positions 
see the recently published volumes: Bozo Zepic, Pat pozicija u Bosni i Hercegovini (Patt position in 
BiH), (Mostar, 2005) and Akademija Nauka i Umjetnosti Republike Srpske, Republika Srpska – Deset 
godina dajtonskog mirovnog sporazuma (Academy of Sciences of RS, Ten years of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement), (Banja Luka, 2005).  
30    OHR, Decision Amending the Constitution of the Republika Srpska, 23 May 2002, at 
http://www.ohr.int/print/?content_id=8455 (Službeni glasnik RS, No. 31/02, 10 June 2002) and 
OHR, Decision Amending the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 23 May 2002, 
at http://www.ohr.int/print/?content_id=8452 (Službene novine FBiH, No. 22/02, 5 June 2002). 
www.eurac.edu/edap   edap@eurac.edu 
15Marko – Post-conflict Reconstruction through State- and Nation-building: The Case of BiH
 
Entities. For the time being, i.e. for the immediate aftermath of conflict 
settlement, this measure can be seen justified by the need to break up ethnic 
homogenisation and to develop interethnic trust. Strict proportional 
representation in the public service is seen as one of the pillars of the 
Autonomy Statute of South Tyrol which enabled the resolution of the ethnic 
conflict there. However, because of this ethnic key, all efforts to strengthen 
the independence, accountability, professional performance through 
education and training, and efficiency of the administration and judiciary 
become all the more important. Only these measures will enable the creation 
of a “corps d’ esprit”, which can counterbalance ethnic affiliations. Efforts 
made by the EU Commission under CARDS Regional in this direction have to be 
strengthened.  
The alternative of “ethnic” versus “civic” is not only a problem of 
institutional structures and elites, but also of the population at large. There is 
almost no overarching “Bosnian” identity and loyalty to the state of BiH, not 
only because of the ethnic cleavages. Paradoxically enough, almost only the 
foreigners in the institutions of BiH (The Central Bank, the Constitutional 
Court, the Human Rights Chamber) developed a “Bosnian” identity. Due to the 
difficulties for housing, getting jobs and proper education for the children, 
refugee returns were and continue to be very difficult. There is a serious 
danger of a second “exodus” and brain-drain as 75% of people between 28 and 
36 are ready to leave the country!
31 Therefore, not only the strengthening of 
civic education and NGOs for a vivid civil society is necessary, but also a 
dramatic improvement of the economic conditions in order to ease the ethnic 
tensions as again the example of South Tyrol clearly shows.  
Despite a full or semi-protectorate of the OHR, a self-sustainable economy 
and functioning state independent of external help do not yet exist. Even if 
HR Petritsch had announced a policy of “ownership” and HR Ashdown changed 
the role from a harsh arbitrator and ruler to a “soft mediator”
32, the record of 
IC intervention in BiH is a mixed one at best. Too often, the IC and even the 
EU does not speak with one voice but is divided along national lines and 
spheres of interest. Moreover, the IC preaches democracy, rule of law and 
protection of human rights. But the “Bonn powers” of the HR are exercised 
too often in an “imperial” way and the dismissals of public functionaries and 
the re-appointment process in the judiciary in 2002 did not meet the lowest 
 
 
31   UNDP, supra note 8. 
32   See Ebner, “The Bonn Powers…”, 118-150. 
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standards of rule of law. Thus all the emphasis on European values and 
standards is in strong danger of losing credibility.
33  
However, European integration with the prospect of EU membership is the 
only perspective the country has, politically, economically as well as 
culturally. “United in diversity”, the motto of the EU, must be brought to life 
in BiH as well. In this way, BiH was not only a Yugoslavia “en miniature”, but 
is such again in European terms. This time, however, not under communist, 
but democratic auspices. Sovereignty and independence of smaller and 
smaller ethnically divided territorial entities cannot cope with the challenges 
of globalisation, but only autonomy and integration, i.e. only a flexible 
federal system from the local to the supra-national level can adapt to the new 
interdependencies. In this way, territorial borders will loose their ethno-
national significance, the multi-national co-operation of organised crime can 
only be fought through inter- and supranational criminal law enforcement. 
And last, but not least, through several territorial units, there are no clear cut 
majorities any longer: everybody will be in a minority position on a specific 
level. Again this experience will counteract all attempts at domination and 
provide the basis for the creation of multiple identities to overcome ethno-
national exclusiveness. 
 
 
33   For a comprehensive overview on problems of rule of law in the Western Balkans countries see 
Joseph Marko, Francesco Palermo and Jens Woelk, “Re-enforcement of the Rule of Law. Division of 
Competencies and Inter-relations between Courts, Prosecutors, the Police, the Executive and 
Legislative Powers in the Western Balkans Countries”, Strategic Studies in CARDS 2003, July 2004, at 
http://www.uni-graz.at/suedosteuropa.  
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